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Dr. Strangeblock or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love the GDPR1 
 
I. Introduction 
As concern surrounding data collection, data privacy, and data protection increases 
exponentially around the world, we are fast realizing how steep a hill proper regulation presents.2 
Most significantly, the recent proliferation of data breaches3 around the world has  spotlighted the 
mass amount of data that is created, collected, stored, sold, and otherwise utilized on a daily basis.4 
Certainly, the collection of personal data points makes human existence easier in seemingly 
infinite ways, but when it leads a consumer to see an advertisement for an item she did not 
previously search for—but needs5—the creeping feeling of big-brother watching you sets in.6 Such 
occurrences are no longer thought of as incidental,7 and a new trend of what can be called “Privacy 
Nihilism” is emerging, where the belief is that the war for our data is lost and resistance seemingly 
futile.8 
On the other side of this data privacy coin sit those who believe all is not lost and the war 
can yet be won through the means of regulation. One notable example is the European Union and 
                                                 
1 See DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964) 
(a satirical take on the cold war and the fear of mutually assured destruction as a deterrence for all-out nuclear war).  
2 See Ian Bogost, Welcome to the Age of Privacy Nihilism, THE ATLANTIC (August 23,2018) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/08/the-age-of-privacy-nihilism-is-here/568198/ 
3 See infra note 42.  
4 For example, it is estimated that 2.5 quintillion bytes of data are created daily. See Bernard Marr, How Much Data 
Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:42 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-
stats-everyone-should-read/#6b46bfd160ba.  
5 “[a] woman has a bottle of perfume confiscated at airport security, and upon arrival sees a Facebook ad for local 
perfume shops”, Bogost, supra note 2.  
6 George Orwell, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).  
7 Bogost, supra note 2.  
8 Id. (“There is no escaping the machinery of actual life, no matter how many brows get furrowed over or tweets get 
sent about it . . . the opponent in the data-privacy invasion is not a comic-book enemy of fixed form, one that can be 
cornered, compromised, and defeated. Instead it’s a hazy murk, a chilling, Lovecraftian murmur that can’t be seen, 
let alone touched, let alone vanquished.”). 
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the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).9 Article 1 of the GDPR states: “[t]his regulation 
protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the 
protection of personal data”.10 Regardless of the perspective, it is clear that the need for data 
protection is now at the forefront of conversation and will not disappear anytime soon.  
 The GDPR’s expansive view on data protection raises many questions concerning its 
practicality. Take, for instance, Article 17 of the GDPR.11 Known more commonly as the “Right 
to Erasure” or “The Right to be Forgotten”, this provision allows an EU citizen to request deletion 
of personal data collected by any business that serves or collects information on citizens the 
Union.12 But what happens when this protective measure clashes with a technology that renders 
the erasure of data collected impractical or even impossible? That is the focus of this paper. Though 
the GDPR is in its nascent stage—having come into effect on May 25, 2018—an inevitable clash 
with another fast-growing technology is imminent.13 That technology is blockchain. Because a 
fundamental principle of blockchain is immutability,14 the idea that data stored on a blockchain 
can be deleted, in compliance with Article 17, is idealistic at best. Inevitably, then, legal disputes 
will arise out of this incompatibility. This paper will discuss: blockchain technology and Article 
17 of the GDPR; analyze the issues of justiciability surrounding the conflict; and suggest a method 
to resolve this type of dispute. To highlight the issue, this paper will use a hypothetical scenario 
that presents a common instance where the overarching problem will occur— credit card 
                                                 
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Of The European Parliament and Of The Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [hereinafter GDPR], 2016 O.J. L 119/1.   
10 Id. at art. 1.  
11 Id. at art. 17. 
12 Id. This is true but subject to some exceptions. See infra notes 147–160.  
13 See Stephanie De Smedt and Valerie Verstraeten, “Blockchain and GDPR: is a clash really inevitable?”, 
LEXOLOGY, August 2, 2018, https:/www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2d91e00d-b434-4301-80ed-
c5c69d92b8e#.  
14  See Primavera De Filippi & Aaron Wright, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 2 (2018) 
(“Blockchains are, in many ways, [] ‘tamper-proof boxes’”).  
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transaction verification.  
 Assume that an American commercial entity uses a blockchain-driven transaction 
verification service that operates on the Ripple platform.15 In a transaction between an EU citizen 
and the American entity, the EU citizen becomes displeased with his purchase and seeks to rid 
himself of all memory of the transaction—including the transaction log containing his credit card 
number and other personal information (e.g., name and address). The citizen requests that the data 
be deleted through invocation of his right under Article 17 of the GDPR.16 Disgruntled to learn 
that the information cannot be deleted, the EU citizen seeks relief. The issue, though, is how can 
this be resolved? 
 Section II of this paper will discuss: (1) blockchain technology and how it can be used in 
transaction verification; and (2) the GDPR broadly and Article 17, specifically. Section III will re-
introduce the hypothetical and offer current views on how to deal with this situation. Section IV 
will analyze the application of the GDPR to this conflict, explain why the two philosophies are 
incompatible, and propose alternative dispute resolution as a means of resolution. Section V will 
conclude with why a mutually assured destruction of both the GDPR and blockchain by each is 





                                                 
15 Ripple is a blockchain platform which focuses its use of blockchain technology to assist in expedited transaction 
verification for financial entities like banks. See Ripple, Use Cases, https://ripple.com/use-cases/banks/. 
16 GDPR, supra note 9, at art. 17.  
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II. Blocks, Chains, and the GDPR 
 A. Blockchains  
 Fundamentally, a blockchain is a type of distributed ledger technology that uses blocks and 
chains to store transaction records.17 A distributed ledger is an umbrella term for any transaction 
type that is decentralized and distributed amongst parties.18 The participants in a blockchain system 
coordinate to keep this ledger up to date.19 A block can be  a single transaction or a collection of 
transactions that also contains reference to previous “blocks”, and an answer to a complex 
mathematical puzzle used to validate the data associated with the “block” itself.20 The method 
through which transactions are validated is referred to as “proof-of-work”,21 where users on the 
platform, known as nodes,22 are tasked with solving a complex and computationally intensive 
mathematical equation.23  
Once a transaction involved in a block is verified by a majority of nodes, the block is added 
to the chain.24 A chain is a collection of blocks connected by hashes which are encrypted strings 
of data which contain references to the transactions within the block, reference to the hash of the 
previous block,25 and a timestamp.26 Notably, all data on a blockchain ledger is redundantly stored 
                                                 
17 Stephanie De Smedt and Valerie Verstraeten, supra note 11. 
18 Id.  
19 Scott J. Shackelford and Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the Power of Blockchain Technology to Build 
Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 334, 342 (2017) 
20 Aaron Wright & Primavera DeFilippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia, 
SSRN 48–49 (Mar. 12, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=2580664 (last visited Dec. 4, 
2018).  
21 Elizabeth Sara Ross, Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner: The Distruptive Role of Blockchain in the Financial 
Services Industry and Current Regulatory Issues, 25 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 353, 364 (2017). 
22 See Id., n. 84.  
23 Id.  
24 Note that an attempt to manipulate a blockchain would need to go through the process of this majority approval 
mechanism. Known as a “51% attack”, this is an arduous and nearly impossible undertaking.   
25 “[this] ensures that preceding blocks are not altered, and a new block is a logical addition to the previous 
blockchain”. Max Danzmann, Asset Transfers Through Blockchain Applications, (2018) 4 JIBFL 238 (2018). 
26 Primavera De Filippi & Aaron Wright, supra note 12, at 22–23.  
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by all nodes—meaning that each node has an exact copy of the ledger which will be accessible at 
any time.27 When changes are entered in one copy, all other copies update simultaneously.28  
Additionally, there are two general types of blockchains: public and private. A public 
blockchain is best described as a ledger where access to the network is unrestricted—meaning any 
user may view the ledger and act within the system.29 Yet, this access can be subject to permissions 
that may require the user to follow an identification procedure to view or act within the 
blockchain.30 The other blockchain type, private, is often a closed network where access and 
participation will be subject to specific conditions like invitation to access the blockchain.31  
With a basic outline of what a blockchain is and how it works, to best understand the 
hypothetical this paper discusses, an explanation of how blockchains can and are used in financial 
transactions is necessary. Private blockchains allow for only certain users to access the platform 
and undertake verification of transactions to be added to the ledger. Financial institutions, for 
instance, are investing in the use of private blockchains with limited and trusted counterparties and 
finding that transaction costs are decreasing. 32 Such investment is undertaken because traditional 
transaction verification is a complex and time-consuming process.  
Take consumer credit card purchases as an example. When a person swipes their credit 
card at a merchant, they are one of five parties involved in the processing of the purchase.33 In 
addition to the consumer and merchant, there is the issuer bank that funds the consumer’s purchase 
                                                 
27 Max Danzmann, Asset Transfers Through Blockchain Applications, (2018) 4 JIBFL 238 (2018). 
28 Marco Iansiti and Karim R. Lakhani, “The Truth About Blockchain”, HARVARD BUS. REV., (Jan.-Feb. 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain.  
29 Max Danzmann, supra note 23, at *3.  
30 Id.; To that end, though, a blockchain can be designed in a manner that is anonymized or pseudonymized, meaning 
the identity of the user can be masked or completely unknown. 
31 Id.. 
32 Marco Iansiti and Karim R. Lakhani, “The Truth About Blockchain”, supra note 25.   
33 See David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine in the Payment Card 
Industry  ¸75 MARYLAND L. REV. 935, 940 (2016).  
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from the merchant, and an acquirer bank that receives the payment.34 Both banks have a contractual 
relationship with a card network, e.g., Visa, whose services they pay for through annual 
membership dues and per-transaction fees.35 When the consumer swipes her card, the merchant 
then transmits the information to the acquirer bank that in turn enquires about the consumer’s 
credit through the card network to the issuer bank.36 If the credit is satisfactory, the approval of 
the transaction from the issuer bank is communicated to the acquirer bank through the card 
network.37 This set-up is typical, but not exclusive.38 
Regardless of the system, though, there is still a card network through which the two parties 
communicate. What if, however, there was a method of using an intermediary to verify this 
transaction type without the membership dues and transaction fees? Scholarship and blockchain 
research and development suggest that this can be done.39 Enter, Ripple—“One frictionless 
experience to send money globally”.40 With blockchain-driven software that facilitates transaction 
settlement by connecting different networks on an open and neutral protocol, what it calls the 
“Interledger Protocol”,41 Ripple serves as the quintessence of disruption to the traditional means 
of transaction verification.42 Ripple directs its services at global payments and aims to reduce 
institutional payment processing time to instantaneous verification—thereby reducing transaction 
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 941 (“[there are] networks in which the issuer bank is the same as the acquirer bank”).  
39 Compare Max Danzmann, supra note 23, at *3–*4 (arguing that blockchains can replace intermediaries if it is 
possible to settle transactions within a specific category of legal transaction without physical exchange of 
performances directly between parties) with Ripple,  Solutions Guide, 
https://ripple.com/files/ripple_solutions_guide.pdf  at 11 (accessed ____) (discussing that Ripple’s software 
connects siloed networks though a protocol which will efficiently facilitate financial settlement through real-time 
settlement). 
40 Ripple, Solutions Guide, https://ripple.com/files/ripple_solutions_guide.pdf ; see  Ripple, Ripple, 
https://ripple.com/. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. (“enabl[es] real-time settlement . . . [and] includes data-rich messaging between all transacting parties—
delivering a real-time payment experience to end users”).  
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costs significantly.43 There is also added security to using a blockchain because of the encryption 
and tamper-proof foundation that a blockchain has when compared to traditional record-keeping 
systems.44 Yet, Ripple is simply one example and one application of blockchain to the financial 
industry, with a plethora of possible solutions either available or in development.45 It cannot be 
doubted, though, that blockchain technology is increasing in its popularity because it offers 
convenience in many important aspects of life.  
B. The GDPR and the Right to be Forgotten  
Like blockchain’s revolutionary impact on the world of technology, the GDPR, which 
became effective on May 25, 2018, also shocked the status quo. To comprehend the regulation in 
its present form, an understanding of how data privacy came to be designated as fundamental in 
the eyes of the European Union (EU) is necessary.46 Generally, the right to privacy in EU countries 
extends to private and public data processors and to all industries.47 The right to privacy in the EU 
originated as a right of individual consent and subsequently the individual right to participate in 
society.48  
                                                 
43 Id. at 16; see also Marco Iansiti and Karim R. Lakhani, “The Truth About Blockchain” (Retailers that offer 
[blockchain-based gift cards] can dramatically lower costs per transaction”).  
44 See, supra, notes 14–20; contra, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(class-action complaint alleged that system maintaining transaction histories which included consumers credit card 
information was inadequately secured); see also FTC, “The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do”, (September 8, 2017) 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do (discussing potential dissemination of 
sensitive personal information of 143 million Americans stemming from inadequate maintenance of record-storing 
system).  
45 See Max Danzmann, supra note 23 at *5–*6 (discussing use of blockchain-driven applications for 
collateralization purposes); see also Sara Elizabeth Ross, supra note 19, at 368–373.  
46 GDPR, supra note 9, at art. 1 (“This regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in 
particular their right to the protection of personal data”); See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union art. 8, 2010 O.J. C 83/389, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:en:PDF.  
47 Michael Rustad and Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing The Right to be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data 
Flow, 28 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 349, 356 (2015). 




Multiple vehicles exist in addition to (and even prior to the drafting, passage, and 
implementation of) the GDPR through which the EU protects citizens’ right to privacy and even 
personal data.49 In 2013, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”)50 revised its privacy principles, first implemented in 1980, to recognize: “ . . . that more 
extensive and innovative uses of personal data bring greater economic and social benefits, but also 
privacy risks”. 51 Yet, the revisions did not recognize a specific right for the data to be forgotten.52 
However, the EU announced in its Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union53, 
broader privacy for the individual in Article 7 of the charter.54 Article 8 of the same lists personal 
data protection as fundamental.55 
The final piece of legislation, and the one which governed privacy law in the EU prior to 
the GDPR, was Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (Data Protection Directive).56 That this 
piece of legislation was a directive indicates how data privacy, though of concern to the EU, was 
not pressing enough  in 1995 to make it uniformly EU law.57 Said another way, the adoption of the 
                                                 
49 Id. at 357–62 (discussing the privacy principles outlined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and the Data Protection Directive of 1995).  
50 The OECD is an international organization whose “[] mission [] is to promote policies that will improve the 
economic and social well-being of people around the world” See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development [hereinafter “OECD”], About the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018). 
51 Id. at 357 (citing OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data ch. 1, 11 (1980), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf.  
52 Id. (citing Rick Mitchell, Revised OECD Privacy Guidelines Focus on Accountability, Notification of Breaches, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.bna.com/revised-oecdprivacy-n17179877087).  
53 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C83/393, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:en:PDF.  
54 Id. at art. 7.  
55 Id. at art. 8. It also imposed the same level of data protection throughout the EU. See Michael Rustad and Sanna 
Kulevska, supra note 45, at 358.  
56 Council Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. L 281/31. 
57 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [hereinafter “TFEU”] art. 288, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.   
 10 
 
directive required member states conform to a minimum level of protection through enactment of 
legislation under their national that met or exceeded what the directive provided.58 With the Data 
Protection Directive, the goal was two-fold: promote the free-flow of data; and to protect 
fundamental human rights.59 Important aspects of the directive also included the view that 
processing of data by a party in a third country cannot inhibit the protection for EU citizens under 
the directive,60 and that processing personal data must be done with consent from the individual—
except where in the scope of ordinary and legitimate business activities, the data may be 
disclosed.61 Importantly, too, the Data Protection Directive’s Article 12(b) contained, though not 
explicitly, what can be considered the first version of what Article 17 of the GDPR provides 
outright—the right to be forgotten.62  
Prior to the enactment of GDPR, the Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU) 
decided a case in 2014 in which it found a right to be forgotten within the Data Protection 
Directive. In Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (“Google 
Spain”),63 the CJEU found that a EU citizen possessed a right to be forgotten under the Data 
Protection Directive.64 In Google Spain, a Spanish national, Mario Costeja González filed suit 
against the AEPD, Google Spain, and La Vanguardia Ediciones SL (a publisher of daily news in 
Spain).65 González alleged that when end users typed his name into a Google search, it showed 
links to La Vanguardia newspaper articles with announcements for a real estate auction related to 
                                                 
58 Id.  
59 Beata Safari, “Intangible Privacy Rights: How Europe’s GDPR Will Set a New Global Standard for Personal Data 
Protection”, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 809, 813 (2017) (citing Council Directive 95/46, supra note 54).   
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. (citing Council Directive 95/46, supra note 54, at art. 12).  
63 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Case C-131/12, 2014, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN.  
64 Id. ¶¶ 1–4.  
65 Id. ¶ 14.  
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attachment proceedings stemming from González’s failure to pay social security debts.66 He 
further argued that despite the accuracy of the articles, they nonetheless injured his reputation and 
invaded his privacy.67 González demanded that the newspaper erase the articles because the 
proceedings concluded ten years previously and were no longer relevant.68 After the newspaper 
refused, citing instruction from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to publish the articles,69 
González demanded that Google remove the link to the stories to eliminate association with them 
to his name.70  
Procedurally speaking, the AEPD first reviewed the dispute and deemed Google 
responsible as a data controller for removing results about the plaintiff from its search platform.71 
Next Google brought the case before the Audencia Nacional, the court of last resort in Spain, which 
in turn referred the case to the CJEU.72 Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen issued his advisory 
opinion on June 25, 2013, and found that Google held no responsibility to remove any links on its 
search engine stemming from a privacy claim.73 His reasoning was that the suppression of 
legitimate and legal information already in public would undermine the freedom of expression and 
objectivity of information on the Internet.74  
In its judgment, the CJEU rejected the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen and instead 
recognized a wide-ranging right to be forgotten under Spain’s implemented analog to the Data 
                                                 
66 Id.  
67 Michael Rustad and Sanna Kulevska, supra note 45, at 363 (citing Dave Lee, What Is the “Right To Be 
Forgotten?”, BBC (May 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27394751).  
68 Google Spain SL, supra note 61, at ¶ 15.  
69 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos , Case C-
131/12, 2014, ¶ 19, http://curia.europa.ed/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=138782&doclang=EN.  
70 Id.  
71 Google Spain SL, supra note 61, at ¶ 17.  
72 Id. ¶¶ 18–20.  
73 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, supra note 67 at ¶ 138.  
74 Id. ¶¶ 120–34.  
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Protection Directive.75 The Court reasoned that because Google was an indexer of information, it 
processed personal data and was subject to the obligations of the Data Protection Directive that 
related to data controllers.76 Citing to articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the Data Protection Directive, the 
Court held that Google owed a duty to erase information from its search index.77 The Court 
determined that search engines enable users to obtain information about a EU citizen by simply 
typing in the individual’s name,78 and that given their role in organizing data, Google was far more 
likely to interfere with the individual’s right to privacy than an original website publisher.79 Thus, 
data subjects in Europe gained the right to demand Google delete links to websites that appear 
when searching for their names unless legitimate reasons not to remove them existed—even if the 
original website had not taken down the content and the data is truthful and otherwise lawful.80 
With this brief history of the predecessors to the now fear-inducing regulation81 outlined, 
a brief description of the GDPR itself, but specifically Article 17 thereof is critical to piecing 
together the conflict between blockchain technology and the regulation’s fundamental protection 
for data protection. Below is a brief outline of how the GDPR came into being and a description 
of Article 17 and what it lists.  
The GDPR was first proposed by the European Commission (EC) in January 2012 and its 
main purpose was to update data protections in light of rapid changes in technology that occurred 
                                                 
75 Google Spain SL, supra note 61.   
76 Id. ¶ 41.  
77 Id. ¶ 82. 
78 Id. ¶ 80. 
79 Note, too that the Court used this reasoning to reject Google’s argument that this imposed duty violated 
proportionality and any removal questions should be directed to the original website publisher. Id. at ¶¶ 63, 94.  
80 Michael Rustad and Sanna Kulevska, supra note 45, at 365, n. 101; see also Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12 at P 
94.  
81 This regulation can be fear inducing because, for example, infringement of rights under Article 17 of the GDPR 
can lead to fines of €20 million or 4% of the previous financial year of the culprit company. Cf. Beata Safari, supra 
note 56, at 825; see also GDPR art. 83.  
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subsequent the passage of the Data Protection Directive.82 The GDPR is a regulation which means 
it is EU law and self-executing and does not require the adoption of analogs on national level to 
have effect.83 The explicit recognition of a right to be forgotten beyond the confines of a search 
engine was included in the version introduced by the EC in January 2012 and approved by the 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (“LIBE”).84 The 
version passed by the European Parliament in April 2016 repealed and superseded the Data 
Protection Directive.85  
Article 1 of the GDPR states: “This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data”.86 Article 3 
outlines the territorial scope of the regulation: “This Regulation applies to the processing of 
personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in 
the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.”87 It is important 
to note that these two articles highlight that: (1) the right is fundamental; and (2) it application is 
not restricted to the boundaries of the European Union.  
Article 17’s title reads: “Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”.88 Paragraph 1 indicates 
that a data subject can request the erasure of personal data without undue delay by the data 
controller when one of the following applies: (1) the data is no longer necessary in relation to why 
it was collected;89 (2) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing of the data was 
                                                 
82 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament of the Council on the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), Explanatory Memorandum § 1.   
83 TFEU, supra note 55.  
84 Michael Rustad and Sanna Kulevska, supra note 45, at 369, n. 112.  
85 See generally GDPR, supra note 9.  
86 Id. at art. 1.  
87 Id. at art. 3(1).  
88 Id. at art. 17. 
89 Id. at art. 17(1)(a). 
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permitted per Article 6(1)(a) or Article 9(2)(a), and when no other legal ground for the processing 
exists;90 (3) the data subject objects to the data processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and no 
legitimate and superseding grounds exists to permit processing, or the subject objects under Article 
21(2);91 (4) the personal data was processed unlawfully;92 (5) erasure is necessary for compliance 
with  a legal obligation imposed by the Union or a Member state to which the controller is subject;93 
or (6) the personal data was collected in relation to the offer of information society services.94 
Paragraph 2 discusses that controllers who make the personal data public must take 
reasonable steps to inform other controllers processing the data aware that a request for erasure 
was made on the data.95 Paragraph 3 outlines exceptions to application of erasure.96 The exceptions 
are: (1) when the processing is necessary for the exercising of the right of freedom of expression 
and information;97 (2) compliance with legal obligation that requires processing imposed by the 
EU or a member state, or for a task to be undertaken in public interest, or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller;98 (3) reasons of public interest in the realm of public health;99 
(4) in furtherance of public interest in the fields of scientific or historical research or statistical 
purposes so far as erasure would render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of data 
processing;100 or (5) establishing, exercising, or defending legal claims.101  
Academics categorize the right to be forgotten as taking three forms: the right to have 
                                                 
90 Id at art. 17(1)(b). 
91 Id at art. 17(1)(c). 
92 Id at art. 17(1)(d). 
93 Id at art. 17(1)(e). 
94 Id at art. 17(1)(f). 
95 Id at art. 17(2).  
96 Id at art. 17(3). 
97 Id at art. 17(3)(a). 
98 Id at art. 17(3)(b) 
99 Id at art. 17(3)(c). 
100 Id at art. 17(3)(d). 
101 Id at art. 17(3)(e). 
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information deleted after a preset period; right to have a clean slate; and the right to be connected 
to current information and delinked from the outdated information.102 The first right describes the 
ability to have information erased by the entities who collect it.103 The second and third rights 
describe a way forward with a fresh start.104 Yet,  confusion surrounds how controllers are to 
determine when the various provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 17 apply when to follow 
them—for example, determining when data which is subject to a request for erasure is no longer 
necessary or where no legal basis for retaining it exists.105 The same can be said about the 
application of the exceptions outlined in paragraph 3, like when a data request runs afoul of the 
freedom of expression.106 Some believe this Article may have a chilling effect on various aspects 
of life such as journalism.107 Some others argue that United States-based controllers will be more 
hesitant to deal with European citizens given the disparity in privacy protection laws and standards. 
108 So, what happens when the data cannot be deleted? 
III. Is Blockchain a Nuclear Bomb? 
 A. The Conflict  
To illustrate the conflict between the GDPR and Blockchain technologies, a common-
occurrence hypothetical suffices—an online credit card purchase. As illustrated above, the 
traditional method of credit card purchase verification can be complicated and time consuming, 
due in large part to the number of parties involved. 109 This exact issue is addressed by companies, 
                                                 
102 Michael Rustad and Sanna Kulevska, supra note 45, at 368.  
103 Id. 
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105 Id. at 369–70.  
106 Id. at 371.  
107 Id. at 374. 
108 See generally, Paul J. Watanabe, An Ocean Apart: The Transatlantic Data Privacy Divide and the Right to 
Erasure, 90 S. CAL. L REV. 1111 (2017).  
109 See David W. Opderbeck, supra notes 30–35.  
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like Ripple, whose platforms seek to streamline the transaction verification process using 
blockchain technology.110  
The question must be asked, then: what happens when an EU citizen purchases an item 
online from an American entity and then later decides he is unhappy and seeks to invoke his Article 
17 right? Take the story of Haider, a Belgian-born EU citizen who decides to purchase a brand-
new head-piece from Frank’s Berets (“Frank’s”).111 Frank’s is an American-based company that 
employs a public, permissionless blockchain to verify its online transactions.112 Given its business 
model, Frank’s deliberately focuses its business strategy to non-EU citizens.113 In search of a “new 
look”, Haider scours the internet to find the hippest, trendiest item emerging from the United 
States. Haider finds Frank’s website and discovers the “Setonia”, the brand-new Fall 2018 beret. 
With rave reviews, and hand-selected New Zealand merino wool, the Setonia is the “hottest 
product in the United States”. Convinced, Haider completes the purchase online and inputs his 
credit card information, as well as his billing and shipping address. Three weeks later, Haider 
receives his beret. 
At first, Haider is enamored with his new purchase. However, after he is teased by his 
friends over his purchase, Haider decides he is unhappy with the beret. Understanding of his 
situation, Frank’s employs its liberal returns policy and refunds Haider. Eager to place all of this 
behind him, Haider requests that Frank’s delete all stored information it possesses relating to 
Haider, and his purchase. He invokes his right under Article 17 of the GDPR114.  Unfortunately, 
                                                 
110 See Ripple, supra note 13.  
111 The author would like to thank Frank X. Wukovits and Haider Gontier, two learned friends and brilliant legal 
minds, for serving as the inspirations for the parties in this hypothetical.  
112 See Ripple, supra note 13; Max Danzmann, supra note 28.   
113 Therefore, it does not voluntarily submit to EU jurisdiction under agreements such as Privacy Shield. See United 
States Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, Privacy Shield Framework, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome (last visited Dec. 4, 2018).    
114 See GDPR, supra note 9, at art. 17.  
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under certain obligations imposed upon Frank’s, it must retain the transaction log.115 When Frank’s 
informs Haider of the impossibility of deleting the information because it is placed on a blockchain, 
an enraged Haider discovers the glaring conflict between the GDPR and Blockchain technology: 
immutability.116 How can this issue be resolved? 
B. Perspectives  
 A recently published thematic report by The European Union Blockchain Observatory and 
Forum (“EUBOF”), entitled: “Blockchain and the GDPR”, addresses this issue.117 The EUBOF 
asserts that: “[t]here is no contradiction in principle between the goals of the GDPR and those of 
blockchain technology. Most GDPR requirements can be applied to most blockchain 
applications.118 Yet, the report acknowledges a conflict in practicality.119An issue that the EUBOF 
brings forward in its report is one that could be important to the issue in the case of Haider and 
Frank’s: accountability.120 Addressing accountability, the Report asserts that who or what qualifies 
as the  “data controller” , for purposes of the GDPR, is subject to debate and concedes that this 
remains open and inconclusively settled in the context of public, “permissionless” blockchains.121 
Members of the blockchain community differ on this point: with some seeking to exclude the 
protocol developers from liability122; others seeking to exclude validating or participating nodes123; 
and others still arguing the contrarian position—that validating or participating nodes are data 
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 The EUBOF report next discusses the concept of data anonymization.125 Parties disagree 
about whether the cryptographic methods employed by most blockchains are exempted from 
GDPR coverage.126 Under the GDPR, if the data processed by an entity is anonymized, it is not 
subject to the regulation.127 Yet, the bar for what qualifies as anonymized is steep; it must be: (1) 
impossible to identify a natural person through any and all of the means “reasonably likely to be 
used”; and (2) irreversible.128 The report concludes that the cryptographic methods employed 
currently do not meet the GDPR exemption, but “[promising areas of cryptographic research] are 
likely to play an integral role in how blockchain-based applications can be made compliant with 
the GDPR.”129 It further concludes that the uses of these cryptographic technologies will need to 
be done on a case-by-case basis.130  
 A final relevant topic in the report is the tension between blockchains and the GDPR over 
data minimization and the right to erasure.131 The report re-affirms that a seeming clash between 
blockchains and the GDPR exists because: “data, once written to the chain, [cannot] be changed. 
This immutability is a key property of the technology.”132 The report next states that even if a data 
controller could be found on a public blockchain, it is impossible to delete or update the record of 
a transaction without destroying the chain.133 It adds, further, that changing to a private, 
                                                 
124 Supporters of this position reason that “through the act of actively downloading and running the software, nodes 
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permissioned blockchain will not necessarily resolve the issue.134 The report offers the following 
solution: since the GDPR does not define erasure specifically, some encryption techniques paired 
with key destruction135 can potentially be considered erasure even if not in the strictest sense of 
the word.136 In its conclusion, the EUBOF offers four general principles to resolve the tension 
between Blockchain and the GDPR: (1) do you really need blockchain?; (2) avoid storing personal 
data on a blockchain and use other methods to anonymize data; (3) collect personal data “off-
chain” or use a private blockchain if unavoidable; and (4) be clear and transparent with users.137  
For one further perspective, consider an article written by Stéphanie De Smedt and Valérie 
Verstraeten from Loyens & Loeff entitled: “Blockchain and GDPR: is a clash really inevitable?”138 
Similar to the assertion of the EUBOF, the authors identify three privacy issues with blockchain 
and the GDPR: (1) who is the data controller; (2) how can data subjects exercise rights; and (3) 
can the two be reconciled?139 Regarding data controllers, the authors argue that the it might be 
possible to identify a central administrator who is the data controller but on the public blockchains 
the answer would be either all nodes qualify as data controllers or none would.140  
On the exercise of rights by data subjects, the authors write that amendment or erasure of 
data is technically impossible because the system is designed to prevent such action.141 Thus, once 
data is added to a blockchain, it cannot be amended or erased and attempting this would require 
                                                 
134 Not necessarily resolved is subject to the assertion that: “unless that network is designed in a way that each and 
every piece of data is readable by only the parties that absolutely need to . . .” Id.  
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adding a new block to the chain to record this change.142 Yet, the initial data will always remain—
leading the authors to question whether the immutability concept of blockchain technology can be 
reconciled with the right to erasure.143  
IV. Away From Mutually Assured Destruction   
A. Does The GDPR Apply?  
A threshold question here is: does the GDPR apply to Frank’s? Article 3 of the GDPR 
outlines the territorial scope of the Regulation.144 In relevant part, Article 3 provides: (1) “[the] 
Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes 
place in the Union or not”145;  and (2) “[] to the processing of personal data subjects who are in the 
Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are 
related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data 
subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behavior as 
far as their behavior takes place within the Union.”146 
In a recently published report,147 the European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”) adopted 
guidelines for interpreting the meaning of Article 3.148 Regarding Article 3(1), the EDPB 
recommended a three-prong analysis to determine “establishment” for purposes of the GDPR’s 
coverage: (1) is there an establishment in the Union149; (2) if so, is there processing of personal 
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data carried out “in the context of the activities” of the establishment;150 and (3) if the processor 
or controller are within the EU, the GDPR will apply regardless of whether the processing occurs 
in the European Union.151 
Under the first prong, and relevant here, the EDPB states: “the degree of stability of the 
arrangements and the effective exercise of activities in [a] Member State must be considered in the 
light of the specific nature of the economic activities and the provision of services . . . this is 
particularly true for undertakings offering services exclusively over the Internet.”152 It notes, too 
that the threshold for “stable arrangement” can be low when the focus of activities of a data 
controller concerns the provision of online services.153 However, the EDPB also noted that “[i]t is 
not possible to conclude that the non-EU entity has an establishment in the Union merely because 
the undertaking’s website is accessible in the Union.154  
Under the second prong, the EDPB indicates that “if a case by case analysis on the facts 
shows that there is an inextricable link between the activities of an EU establishment and the 
processing of data carried out by a non-EU controller, EU law will apply to that processing by the 
non-EU entity, whether or not the EU establishment plays a role in that processing of data.”155 On 
this point, the EDPB recommends that all concerned organizations assess: (1) whether personal 
data are processed; and (2) analyze any links between the purpose of processing and the activities 
of any presence of the organization in the Union.156 The third prong, lastly, indicates that 
controllers and processors located in the EU are responsible for GDPR compliance and obligations 
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regardless of the location of the data processing.157 
Under Article 3(2), the EDPB provides that the absence of an establishment in the EU does 
not necessarily relieve a data controller or processor in a third-country.158 The EDPB outlines a 
two-factor analysis for this provision: (1) does the processing relate to personal data of data 
subjects who are in the Union; and (2) does it relate to the offering of goods or services or to the 
monitoring of data subjects’ behavior in the Union.159 Regarding this section, the EDPB states that 
the processing of data alone is not sufficient to trigger application of the GDPR, there must be an 
element of targeting individuals in the EU by: (1) offering goods or services; or (2) monitoring 
their behavior.160 
In the case of Frank’s berets, there is a strong likelihood that the GDPR may not even 
apply. Under: Article 3(1); the guidelines provided by the EDPB; CJEU case law; and because 
Haider discovered Frank’s website, that Frank’s website is merely accessible within the EU on the 
internet may not meet this critical threshold.161 Haider sought out Frank’s website to purchase the 
beret. Frank’s, assumedly, created its website for customers domiciled in the United States, only. 
Further under Article 3(2), Frank’s only processed the data of Haider when the transaction was 
initiated and completed—it did not deliberately target nor monitor Haider.162 Therefore, Frank’s 
likely would be relieved of GDPR coverage and fulfilling any obligations thereunder.  
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B. The Perspectives Applied 
For the sake of argument, assume that Frank’s is subject to GDPR coverage. Applying the 
above-mentioned perspectives163, Frank’s remains free from responsibility to Haider. In theory, 
the vision of the EUBOF to reconcile blockchain with the GDPR in general may occur one day; 
but it must be re-stated that in the absence of a specific definition for erasure, Article 17 of the 
GDPR and blockchain technology’s immutability principle cannot, and realistically should not, be 
reconciled. Any change to the blockchain does not remove the content, but rather will alter the 
chain but retain the original information, regardless.164 This does not solve any issues. Applying 
the four solutions outlined by the EUBOF to the present hypothetical further illuminates the 
conflict. The four solutions offered by the EUBOF are: (1) do you really need blockchain?; (2) 
avoid storing personal data on a blockchain and use other methods to anonymize data; (3) collect 
personal data “off-chain” or use a private blockchain if unavoidable; and (4) be clear and 
transparent with users.165  
Returning to Haider and his concern: Frank’s would argue the need for a blockchain to 
process its transactions. The reason is that a blockchain platform that simplifies and expedites the 
verification of credit card transactions is critical to cash flow—in that it will significantly decrease 
the time to receive the funds166—and save the company from membership fees to credit card 
networks.167 Next, Frank’s may assert that storing credit card transactions on a blockchain is the 
safest method of retaining the transaction logs and credit card information in light of the recent 
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slew of data breaches of companies retaining credit card information.168 Third, the use of a private 
blockchain does not alleviate the problem. As the EUBOF admits, the information cannot be 
removed from the chain without altering it. Also, Frank’s would point to a possible legal obligation 
for why it needs to retain transaction logs.169 Therefore, Frank’s would have a sound basis to argue 
the need for it to use a blockchain-driven storage platform. 
C. A Call for Alternative Dispute Resolution  
This paper has undertaken to explain the fundamental issue that proponents of both 
blockchain technology and those who champion the GDPR face: they are incompatible and 
practically irreconcilable.170 Yet, it is against most rules of reason to say that an individual faced 
with a situation where his personally identifiable information is incapable of erasure should be 
without a form of relief.171 For that reason, an alternative avenue of dispute resolution should be 
explored if and when an EU citizen who seeks to invoke the Article 17 right to erasure against an 
entity using a blockchain-driven technology to process the data.  
In the absence of some form of resolution, the result is a chilling effect on the GDPR. 
Likewise, too strong a resolution, like a binding opinion of the CJEU, the chill may fall on 
blockchain technology itself. In Stanley Kubrick’s cinematic classic, Dr. Strangelove or: How I 
Learned To Stop Worrying And Love The Bomb,172 the film tackles the intriguing theme of 
restraint driven by a fear of “mutually assured destruction”. Mutually assured destruction is 
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effectively a situation where both sides in a conflict possess the same capability to cripple or 
destroy the other once provoked by the other. The result is, then, that both sides will restrain from 
provoking the other—driven by the knowledge that it could not survive attacking the other. 
 In the context of the GDPR and blockchain technology, the institution of an action by a 
EU citizen in the CJEU seeking to invoke his article 17 right to erasure would lead to a “nuclear 
bomb” dropping on blockchain technology in the form of a binding decision. Likewise, refusing 
to delete or alter records on a blockchain without providing relief cripples the purpose of the 
GDPR’s article 17 right—a right deemed fundamental by the EU.173 
To avoid the fallout that a binding decision of the CEJU or refusal to delete causes, 
arbitration as the method of dispute resolution could prove to be the most efficient method of 
resolution. Arbitration prevents the CJEU rendering an interpretation of Article 17 and stifle the 
development of blockchain technologies. It also prevents commercial entities from weakening the 
GDPR. Arbitration is contractual in nature—allowing parties to bargain for the means and methods 
for resolving their issues. In the realm of complex and niche dispute resolution—as a conflict 
between the GDPR and blockchain would be—the parties could bargain to select a third-party 
neutral  who is versed in both the GDPR and blockchain and he or she could provide a fair 
resolution that is non-binding on courts and could potentially fulfill the spirit of the GDPR—to 
uphold the fundamental freedom of protection for personal data.174 One such forum competent to 
review this dispute type could potentially be the International Centre for Dispute Resolution 
(“ICDR-AAA”), a subsidiary of the American Arbitration Association.175  
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The ICDR-AAA provides a service specifically for disputes brought under the Privacy 
Shield framework176, so it is within reason to assume that it could be competent to assess and 
adjudicate the dispute between parties like those of Haider and Frank’s Berets. Instead of 
compromising the validity of a revolutionary technology or a preeminent piece of personal data 
protection legislation, concerned parties should seek to find the middle path.  
V. Conclusion  
In the age where personal data protection finds itself in the spotlight, competing interests 
will undoubtedly seek to shape the future of data protection legislative efforts. This paper sought 
to explain what blockchain technology is, why it is useful in important aspects of commercial 
activity—notably in credit card transactions—and explain its fundamental incompatibility with 
Article 17 of the GDPR by using a hypothetical situation which will not be uncommon. The result, 
that the GDPR does not apply, is a matter of threshold; but applying an analysis to whether 
information stored on a blockchain could be “erased” to satisfy the rights afforded EU citizens 
under the GDPR showed how these two philosophies could produce a “Mutually Assured 
Destruction” and that to avoid activating a “Doomsday Machine”177 parties should pursue 
alternative dispute resolution before a neutral well-versed in both blockchain and the GDPR.  
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